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AUTAS: a tool for supporting FMECA generation in
aeronautic systems
Claudia Picardi1, Luca Console1, Frederic Berger2, Jan Breeman3, Tony Kanakis3, Jeroen Moelands3
Stephan Collas4, Emmanuel Arbaretier4, Nino De Domenico5, Ermanno Girardelli5, Oskar Dressler6
Peter Struss 7, Benjamin Zilbermann8
Abstract. The goal of the FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects and Crit-
icality Analysis) process is to determine the consequences that fail-
ures may have on the function of a complex system. In aeronautic
industries, this process is very important and must comply with in-
ternational standards. Today, most of the process is performed man-
ually. This can be problematic, since, although the basic process is
not difficult, taking into account all behaviors and all the interactions
between the behaviors of several components of a system can be very
complex, error prone and costly. In the paper, we discuss how MBR
(Model Based Reasoning) can support the process and we present a
software environment which implements this concept.
1 INTRODUCTION
FMECA (Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis) is a tech-
nical process which is performed on engineered artifacts in order to
analyse the consequences that failures may have on a system function
and behavior. It is performed after each phase in the design process
to verify that the system does not manifest critical behavior and loss
of function whenever one of the components fails to operate prop-
erly. In case reliability requirements are not met, this should lead to a
re-design of the system. A table reporting the FMECA should also be
provided as a final documentation of the system behavior; this is im-
portant in case the system is used as a component of a more complex
system (to perform the FMECA of the complex system) and as a doc-
umentation to be provided to people that will perform maintenance
and diagnosis/repair of a system.
An example of a FMECA table is reported in figure 1. Each row
of the table corresponds to a fault occurrence in a system component
and it reports (among other things):
• the local effect of the fault (i.e. the effect at the level of the com-
ponent itself);
• the next-higher level effect (i.e. the effect at the level of the sub-
system the component belongs to);
• the end effect (i.e. the effect on the overall system );
• an indication of the severity of the fault (on a scale from I to IV);
• the method that can be used to detect the presence of the fault.
1 Dip. Informatica, Univ. Torino, Italy, email: picardi@di.unito.it
2 Eurocopter, Marseille, France
3 National Aerospace Laboratory NLR, AVCE, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
4 Sofreten, Paris, France
5 Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A., Torino, Italy
6 Occ’m Software, Munich, Germany
7 Tech. Univ. Munich, Munich, Germany
8 Israel Aircraft Industries, Tel Aviv, Israel
Notice that the effects are given in qualitative terms: either some-
thing that was supposed to happen does not, or something happens
unexpectedly.
The FMECA process is very critical in aerospace companies,
where legislation imposes standards for reliability and also for the
FMECA process itself and for presentation formats (see as an exam-
ple the military standards [1]). Today this activity is performed man-
ually by expert engineers, based on their experience. They reason
exploiting their knowledge of components and subsystems behavior
(possibly in the form of the FMECA of a subsystem), to determine
the behavior of the system in case a component fails. This activity is
very time-consuming, because the analysis has to be performed for
each different scenario in which a system is used (e.g., take-off, land-
ing). Moreover, it has also to be performed for every configuration or
smaller variant of each individual system.
The activity, in a sense, is very routinely and it requires reasoning
patterns which per-se are not very complicated since they involve
a qualitative analysis of the system behavior, which is a very usual
form of reasoning for an expert engineer. However, the activity is at
the same time very complex. First of all, all effects, even very remote
ones, have to be taken into account (a critical effect may manifest in
a component which is physically and logically very distant from the
fault). Second, it requires taking into account intrinsically redundant
systems with many components, and thus many paths of interaction
between components and subsystems9. Finally, although FMECA is
usually based on a single-fault assumption, it is important to check
that, for very critical systems, the occurrence of a second fault does
not lead to safety critical situations. This means that several aspects
and interactions have to be taken into account simultaneously.
FMECA requires very expert specialists and this aspect may be
critical to maintain and manage corporate knowledge; all the experi-
ence and work should not get lost in case of changes in the staff.
The above mentioned considerations, namely the fact that the ac-
tivity is error-prone and that corporate knowledge should be stored
and managed, call for the introduction of software tools that auto-
mate some of the phases and support the whole activity. Indeed tools
for supporting FMECA have been produced, marketed and used in
the last few years, see, e.g., SIMFIA [6] and AutoSteve [3, 4]. None
of them, however, has been designed to meet the demanding needs
of the aerospace industry; all of them have limitations; e.g., Au-
toSteve is limited to electric and electronic circuits, while SIMFIA
only works on systems described in terms of Boolean equations.
9 A “sneak circuit” [8], is an example of this problem; in this case we may
have unexpected behavior due to unexpected current flows in a circuit. De-
termining these situations may be difficult even for an expert engineer.
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Failure Mode Effects Analysis 
System Description:  Landing Gear 
Operation Mode:  Flight - Level 2 
 
Item 
Number 
Item 
Description Function 
FM. 
Id. 
Failure 
Mode Local Effect 
Next Higher 
Effects End Effects Sev. 
Detection 
Method 
Compensatin
g 
Provisions 
Remarks 
1.1.1 Main Pump Provides 
pressure when 
requested by 
Pilot Command 
1 Fails to 
operate 
No effect during 
this phase 
No effect during 
this phase 
No effect IV Indication to 
pilot 
None  
  
 2 Untimely 
operation 
Untimely 
hydraulic 
pressure in Main 
Hydraulic 
Generation 
Assembly 
Untimely 
hydraulic 
pressure from 
Main Hydraulic 
Generation 
Assembly to 
Actuator 
Assembly 
Untimely 
extension of 
Landing Gear 
I Indication to 
pilot 
None  
1.1.2 Check Valve 
(Main) 
Prevents reverse 
flow 
1 Stucked 
closed 
Loss of fluid flow 
through the Main 
Generation 
Assembly check 
valve 
No effect during 
this phase 
No effect IV Indication to 
pilot 
None  
  
 2 Stucked 
open 
Permits fluid flow 
through the main 
assy check valve 
when not 
required 
No effect during 
this phase 
No effect IV Undetected None  
 
Figure 1. An example of FMEA table
The development of a software environment supporting FMECA
in aerospace industry is the goal of the AUTAS European project10,
which aims at implementing the aeronautic standards to support the
generation of FMECA. The solution we propose is based on (i) the
adoption of a model-based approach to represent the models of the
components and systems under examination and (ii) qualitative rea-
soning as the basic inference mechanism for performing FMECA.
These choices are motivated by the qualitative nature of the FMECA
process as it is currently carried out in the partner companies; they
will be presented and discussed in the subsequent sections.
2 GOALS AND CONCEPTS
At a very abstract level, the goals of the project can be summarized
as follows: developing a software environment that can manage cor-
porate knowledge about systems and their FMECAs and automate
some of the inference steps of the FMECA. A FMECA supporting
software can therefore be seen as an integrated environment offering
tools that support different steps of a FMECA:
• A tool for mantaining libraries of components and subsystems
models. Such models should be generic and reusable, following
a compositional principle: a new system can be created by com-
posing existing components and subsystems; the new system is
added to the library so that it is possible both to analyse it and to
instantiate it as a part of a more complex system.
Together with each component or system the user must be able
to define the effects she wants to study on it. For example, for a
pump, the user might want to consider the effect “pump produces
no pressure”, while for a landing gear extraction system the user
might be interested in the effect “landing gear does not extract”.
10 AUTAS, GRD1-2001-40133: AUTomating FMECA for Aircraft Systems;
partners: Alenia Aeronautica, Eurocopter, Israel Aircraft Industries, NLR,
OCC’M, Sofreten, Technical University of Munich, University of Torino.
http://www.di.unito.it/ autas/
This tool must include a Graphical User Interface that makes it
possible for specialists to define models in a simple way.
• A tool for editing mission scenarios: for a given system FMECA
should be performed in different operating conditions (missions).
• A tool for performing the basic inference steps underlying
FMECA, that is determining the consequence of a component fail-
ure, at all the levels (local, next higher, end). Basically, the tool
should be able to reason on component and system models to gen-
erate predictions.
• A tool for integrating such predictions with further information,
e.g., that concerning criticality, obtained from the library and/or
directly provided by the user, and for producing the final FMECA
table with different presentation formats11.
From a more technical point of view, the project is based on the
following principles:
• Component-oriented modeling. The library is composed of mod-
els of generic component types; multiple instances of a type can
be generated to create a subsystem model, which, in turn, will be
added to the library as a new type (i.e., multiple instances can be
generated to create the model of a more complex system).
This means that the library must support modeling at multiple hi-
erarchical levels. In this way, specialists (engineers) focus on mod-
eling elementary components (e.g. pipe, check valve, pumps, ...).
The principle of compositionality allows users to quickly create
more and more complex models starting from elementary com-
ponents (e.g. the model of the landing gear of an aircraft can
be obtained by composing electronic and hydraulic subsystems
and components). Furthermore, the possibility of re-using generic
component models allows the user to easily produce multiple vari-
ants and configurations of a system.
11 The ability to configure the representation format of the FMECA table is
a major issue, since different companies must comply with different and
rigid standards.
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• Qualitative modeling. Models describe the behavior of a compo-
nent by in terms of qualitative constraints that relate variables of a
component for each behavior mode. This representation captures
the distinctions which are needed to support FMECA. For exam-
ple, in order to produce the FMECA of an hydraulic system, it
is sufficient to reason in terms of presence or absence of flow in a
circuit, or in terms of the fact that a flow is lower than it should be,
without taking into account the exact numeric value of the flow or
of its deviation. Moreover, a qualitative approach to modeling and
reasoning was successfully adopted for diagnosis and diagnosis
related activities, to other application areas, such as the automo-
tive field (see e.g., [2, 3, 4, 5, 7]).
• Hierarchical reasoning. FMECA is performed according to a hi-
erarchical scheme, following the prescriptions of the standards
adopted by aeronautic industries. This means that the process mir-
rors the hierarchical composition of models: given a component,
the consequences (effects) of its faults must be evaluated at the
level of the component itself (local effects), at the level of the sub-
system to which it belongs (next higher level effect), and at the
level of the overall system (end effects).
3 TOOLS IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we analyse the three tools constituting AUTAS (Mod-
els and Mission Builder (MMB), Qualitative FMEA Engine (QFE),
FMECA Support System (FSS); see figure 2) and we discuss some of
the choices in the software design and implementation. The overall
architecture of the software is sketched in figure 2. We can see that
the MMB supports both model editing and mission editing.
As said before, one of the two main goals was to build a persis-
tent archive allowing users to reuse existing knowledge. This goal is
achieved through the Model Library, that can be created and main-
tained with the aid of the MMB, and stored in the Model Repository.
The first basic choice we made was thus the definition of a stan-
dard language for the model library, in particular defining:
• The qualitative domains for different physical quantities such as
for flow, pressure, current intensity, resistance, etc.
• A standard representation of a component type model, defined
through a set of attributes with well specified semantics: interface
variables, state variables, behavior modes (including an OK mode
and a set of fault modes) and the sets of constraints defining them.
• The representation of a system as a set of component type in-
stances that are connected via their interface variables.
• The effects that one wants to observe on a given entity (compo-
nent, subsystem or system); in particular it has been decided that
an effect is represented by a constraint among (some of) the vari-
ables of the entity.
• Mission scenarios, that is the specific operating context and con-
ditions in which the FMECA has to be performed; specifying a
scenario corresponds to setting a value for state variables that are
part of the components in the system under examination.
These standards have been implemented with an XML schema.
The second goal is to automate the inference steps behind
FMECA, in order to generate automatically a FMECA table. The
process of producing a FMECA table can be split in three phases,
depicted in figure 2:
Phase 1: the MMB exports the qualitative model of a system to-
gether with a mission scenario towards the Qualitative FMEA En-
gine.
MMB
Model
Editor
Mission
Editor
Model
Repository
Qualitative
FMEA
Engine
Phase 1
System Model
+
Mission
Phase 2
FMEA Results
FMECA
Support
System
Phase 3
System Model
(with additional data)
+
Mission
+
FMEA Results
USER (Engineer)
Figure 2. Software architecture
Phase 2: the QFE produces the inferences, by associating with each
fault mode the effects that can be observed on the system at the
different hierarchical levels when the fault is present.
Phase 3: the MMB endows the system model with additional data
about fault probability and severity, as well as text descriptions
that need to be printed out in the FMECA table. It exports such
data together with the results of QFE towards FSS. FSS allows
the user to format data in a FMECA table, by using existing data,
doing some basic computation (e.g. the criticality of a fault), or
entering other information.
Again the exchange of data among the different tools takes place by
exchanging XML files. Thus not only the representation of the input
data (models and mission scenarios) is standardized with an XML
schema, but also the representation of intermediate results.
3.1 Model and Mission Builder
The MMB is a graphical tool for maintaining models and missions
that will be stored in the “Models and Missions Library”. Figure 3
shows a screenshot of the tool GUI. Each component type is defined
independently of the system it will be used in. Subsystems can be
created by connecting instances of component types, where the con-
nection is provided by means of interface variables of the same type.
The tool supports hierarchical modeling, in the sense that, once a sub-
system has been defined, it can be used as a component of a higher
level system.
The behavioral model is qualitative (i.e., variables range over qual-
itative domains) and it can be expressed as a set of constraints, each
one described with a table. The tool also allows the user to introduce
parameters concerning fault criticality, e.g., the probability of failure
of each component (and each fault mode). For each component, sub-
system or system it is possible to define the effects that one wants
to observe. An effect is defined as a constraint relating the variables
of the component, subsystem or system it is being associated with.
Let us suppose that we want to define the effect “landing gear does
not extract” for the landing gear extraction subsystem. The system
description will involve a variable, let us say X, representing the
qualitative status of the landing gear extraction (+ for extracted, 0 for
not extracted), and a second variable, C representing the command
sent to the subsystem by the pilot (0 for off, 1 for on). Then the above
mentioned effect can be described as (C = 1) ∧ (X = 0).
A mission scenario is defined as a specific situation in which the
-6-
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Figure 3. The Graphical User Interface of MMB
behavior of a system has to be analysed. It is characterized by a spe-
cific configuration of the system (e.g., only some components or sub-
systems may be active in that situation; this is obtained by selecting
a specific system model) or by a specific operational mode of other
components (i.e., to a specific setting of some of the components
variables that in this case behave as sorts of parameters). For ex-
ample, a scenario may correspond to the landing phase, where the
landing gear is initially retracted and the landing gear extraction sub-
system is switched on in order to extract it. In this scenario C = 1,
thus if the landing gear does not extract (X = 0) we have the above
mentioned effect “landing gear does not extract”.
3.2 Qualitative FMEA Engine
The Qualitative FMEA12 Engine (QFE) is the core of our software as
it is the inference engine supporting the process.
FMEA requires to determine the consequences of each single fault
of each component under each specified scenario; this corresponds to
“simulating” the system in the situation where the component under
examination is assigned a fault mode and all the others are in the
OK mode. This analysis has to determine whether an effect from a
set of pre-specified effects occurs. Effects correspond to certain vio-
lations of the intended function of the faulted component itself, the
subsystem it belongs to (”next level effects”) and the entire system
(”end effects”). Technically, this is done by constraint solving which
provides values for the variables that specify the effects. From those
values the engine can extract the pieces of information to be inserted
in the FMECA table; in particular:
• The values of specific variables directly provide information on
the consequences of the fault (e.g., the fact that a tank is empty or
that an actuator does not operate).
• Knowledge about the system structure and hierarchy, with the de-
fined effects, allows the engine to infer the functionalities that are
lost (next higher level and end effects).
12 FMEA (Failure Mode Effects Analysis) is FMECA without Criticality
Analysis.
Figure 4. FMECA as a constraint solving problem
Let us briefly illustrate the required inferences as a constraint solv-
ing problem. Models of behavior modes are stated as relations (con-
straints) over a set of system variables. Scenarios specify certain
exterior conditions and a particular state of the system and are ex-
pressed as a relation over the respective model variables. The joins
of the model relations and the scenario relation describe the behavior
of the system under this scenario, S. In figure 4, these are displayed
as sets OK(S) and FMi(S) for the correct behavior and some fault
FMi. Also the interesting effects are represented as relations over a
different subset of variables, namely those that can be used to char-
acterize the function and, hence, its violation. Because of the nature
of effects, they are only well-specified if their associated relation and
the correct behavior relation are disjoint, as indicated in figure 4 for
two effects Eff1, Eff2. The FMEA analysis can then be stated as the
problem of computing the join of the fault mode relation under sce-
nario S and the effect relations (see Eff2(FMi) in figure 4). In the
QFE, this computation is performed as constraint propagation based
on Ordered Multiple Decision Diagrams (OMDD).
3.3 FMECA Support System
The FSS is responsible for producing a standard output for the
FMECA, including also additional information that can be computed
or directly taken from the library, or provided by the user. In order to
generate the output, the tool must integrate two types of information:
(i) the output of the QFE, which provides a description of the conse-
quences of each fault of each component; (ii) information about fault
probability and severity, which is used to compute the criticality of
-7-
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Figure 5. The Graphical User Interface of FSS
each fault. The output can be formatted with different layouts, in or-
der to comply with industrial standars, selecting how to display each
type of information and organizing or aggregating the table columns
in different ways (figure 5 shows the GUI). Moreover, the output can
be output to a file in different languages: XML or HTML for visual-
ization, Excel sheets for further editing, and others.
4 CONCLUSIONS
In the paper we presented a software environment we designed and
implemented to support the FMECA process in aeronautic industries.
The FMECA of subsystems and systems of an aircraft (or helicopter)
is very important as it is the basis of reliability aspects concerning
the aircraft. The activity is currently performed manually and this
can be problematic, since taking into account all behaviors and all
the interactions between the behaviors of several components of a
system can be very complex, error prone and costly.
In the paper we presented a software that supports the process; the
core of the tool is a qualitative reasoning engine that can determine in
an automatic way the consequences of each fault of each component
of a system. The software relies on the use of a library of models
of components, thus allowing an engineer to analyse easily several
variants of a system or several contexts or configurations or operation
modes (missions) on the same system.
The software is currently being used by the three industrial part-
ners (IAI, Alenia and Eurocopter) and by NLR in order to test its
behavior on different types of models. In particular, a first experi-
mentation has been carried on a simple hydraulic model of the land-
ing gear actuation (including a pump, a backup pump, valves, con-
trollers and the actuator driving the gear). Given the interesting re-
sults obtained on this system, the attention focused on more complex
systems: the Electronic Power Generation System of a military air-
plane, the Transmission Gearbox of an helicopter, the Landing Gear
of a business jet aircraft and the Air-Conditioning System of a civil
aircraft. The modelled components are essentially hardware parts;
we considered open loop models and we abstracted from problems
in the control software. Dynamics are taken into account by consid-
ering different single-snapshot scenarios; the user is responsible for
identifying significant states in the dynamics of the system and se-
lecting them for FMECA generation. This mirrors what is currently
done manually.
The first experimentations showed that the model-based support
can have a significant impact in improving FMECA in aeronautic ap-
plications. Indeed engineers dealt comfortably with qualitative mod-
els, although the effort for building models is significant, even for
simple components. This means that the effort for building actually
reusable model libraries will be a major one, but the availability of
such libraries will greatly propel the importance of AUTAS results.
FMECA will in fact be easier, faster and more reliable.
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